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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BACLE D. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
E. ~L ROYLE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8028 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE:NIENT OF FACTS 
Respondent ·was employed by appellant as manager 
and salesman of a retail radio and television store at 
Provo, Utah. The employment commenced on March 
1st, 1949, by oral agreement, which was reduced to 
writing in September, 1949 (Tr. P3). The employment 
ran from March 1st, 1949, to February 28, 1950, inclusive. 
(Exhibit A, Tr. P4). Certain terms of the agreement 
regarding salary and bonus were subsequently mutually 
changed. Under the agreement, as modified, respondent 
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2 
received $250.00 per month salary, plus $5.00 for each 
television set sold, plus 77o of the gross sales, excluding 
warranties and antennaes, over $30,000.00 volume. (Ex-
hibit A, Tr. P5 ). It is undisputed that respondent worked 
under this contract for the year March 1st, 1950, to 
February ~H, 1951. (rrr. P5 and 53). It was stipulated 
by the parties that, after deducting from what respondent 
owed appellant for a television set received by the re-
~pondent and an adjustment in social security deductions, 
appellant \ras indebted to respondent for the contract 
year ending February 28, 1951, the sum of $141.72. (Tr. 
P45). This amount is paragraph 1·of the .Judgment and 
is not an issue on thi~ appeal. 
Respondent claimed a new contract was formed on 
or about :\lay 15, 1951, retro-active to l\{arch 1st, 1951 
for the year .Jiarch 1st, 1951 to February 28, 1952. 
(Tr. P39, 40 and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5). Re-
spondent testified that between March 1st, 1951 and 
about l\Iay 15, 1951, nothing was said about a change in 
the contract under which respondent had been working. 
(Tr. P39, 40). During this time respondent accepted his 
salary and bonus based on the contract in force the 
previous year (Tr. P30). Appellant denied there was a 
new contract between the parties, and stated the old 
contract continued, while negotiations were proceeding 
to\rard the formation of a new contract. (Tr. P5, 30, 
32, 55, 56 and 67 and Exhibit J). 
From March 1st, 1951, to July 13, 1951, at which 
time respondent voluntarily left the employ of the ap-
pellant (Tr. P27, 46) appellant paid and respondent 
accepted without protest, question or objection, com-
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pensation on the smne terms and amount as during the 
previous year. (Tr. P30, 36). Respondent sued appellant 
on an express contract only. (Complaint, Schedule A of 
Complaint, Interrogatories and Answer to Interroga-
tories.) 
The trial court found the respondent failed to prove 
the allegations of his Complaint, i.e. an express contract 
as alleged in the Complaint and fully set out in Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 5 (Findings of Fact No. 4 and 5 and 
:Memorandum Decision). The Court found that the 
previous contract had expired March 1, 1951 (Finding 
of Fact No. 5 and :Memorandum Decision). That re-
spondent should recover on quantum meruit (Memoran-
dum Decision) and that $5,000.00 per annum was a rea-
sonable yearly con1pensation, that $1,837.18 was a reason-
able compensation for respondent's services from March 
1st, 1951 to July 13, 1951. (Findings of Fact No. 6 and 
:Memorandum Decision). 
INTRODUCTION. TO ARGUMENT 
In considering this case, it is to be borne in mind 
that respondent voluntarily left the employ of the appel-
lant on July 13, 1951. There was no discharge of the 
respondent by the appellant, hence the questions which 
arise as a result of an unlawful discharge, such as the 
prevention of the completion of the contract, unjust 
enrichment and restitution are not involved. Doctrines 
and cases relating to breach of contract and acceptance 
of benefits under part performance of contracts are not 
in point. The issue is not one of damages for breach of 
contract or the measure of unjust enrichment. 
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Express contract, and express contract only, was 
pleaded. Trial was had on express contract only. Evi-
< h·nc·p of express contract only was adduced at the trial. 
The n•:-;pondent did not plead, pray for, or prove an 
implit•d <·on tract or quantum meruit. The trial Court had 
no basit; in law or fact to give judg1nent on implied con-
trad or quantmu meruit. The folJ("'·inr~ arguments con-
elu:-;in·ly :-:lw\\' this error. 
ARGr~fEXT 
POIXT 1. 
THE PLEADINGS JOINED ISSUE ON AN EXPRESS 
CONTRACT ONLY AND TRIAL WAS HAD ON THAT ISSUE 
ONLY. IT WAS ERROR, THEREFORE, FOR THE COURT 
TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT UPON IMPLIED CONTRACT, VIZ. 
QUANTUM MERUIT. 
POI~T ~0. 2 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT IN THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE WAS INTRODUCED FROM VVHICH THE COURT 
COULD FIND FOR THE RESPONDENT ON IMPLIED CON-
TRACT, i. e. QUANTUM MERUIT. 
POINT 3. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, IN THAT THE 
EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT 
WAS EMPLOYED UNDER AN EXPRESS CONTRACT AND 
COULD NOT THEREFORE RECOVER ON THE BASIS OF 
AN IMPLIED CONTRACT. 
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POINT NO.1 
THE PLEADINGS JOINED ISSUE ON AN EXPRESS 
CONTRACT ONLY AND TRIAL WAS HAD ON THAT ISSUE 
ONLY. IT WAS ERROR, THEREFORE, FOR THE COURT 
TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND JUDGMENT UPON IMPLIED CONTRACT, VIZ. QUAN-
TUM MERUIT. 
Respondent's complaint alleged appellant was in-
debted to the respondent •' according to the account an-
nexed as Exhibit "A." Exhibit ''A" is a statement 
showing the basis of respondent's claim, and as to the 
matter on appeal reads: 
''To salary at the rate of $5,000.00 per year 
from ~Iarch 1st, 1951 to July 13, 1951, $1,837 .13. '' 
Respondent's reference to salary refers to an ex-
press contract. This is true both for the period March 1, 
1951 to July 13, 1951 and for the month of February, 
1951. Admittedly, the claimed February 1951 salary was 
based on express contract. The claims for both periods 
are pleaded the same way, i.e. as an express contract. 
"The word 'salary' imports a specific con-
tract for a specified sum for a specific period of 
time, while 'wages' are compensation for services 
by the day or week.'' Blick vs. Mercantile Trust 
& Deposit Co., 77 At. 844, 846, 113 Md. 487, 
Words and Phrases, Per. Ed., Vol. 38, page 51. 
"Salary is a fixed annual or periodic pay-
ment for services, depending upon the time and 
not upon the amount of service rendered.'' Words 
and Phrases, Per. Ed., Vol. 38, Pages 48, 49. 
~ To further clarify and limit the issues, appellant sub-
mitted interrogatories to respondent. Answering these 
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interrogatories, respondent stated the agreement for 
February was written (answering Interrogatory No. 3). 
In answering Interrogatory No. 4, respondent stated that 
the agreement from March 1st through July 13, 1951, 
was an oral agreement. 
In answering lnterrogatoryNo. 5, respondent set 
forth the t(•rms of this alleged oral agreement as follows: 
"5. An;-;wering interrogatory No. 5, plaintiff 
~tates that the agreement was for plaintiff to work 
for as manager and salesman for defendant's re-
tail store at Provo, Utah, for a salary at the rate 
of $5,000.00 per annum, commencing March 1, 1951, 
said salary payable at $300.00 per month until the 
1st day of November, 1951, at which time the bal-
ance of $116.66 earned but unpaid for each of all 
the previous months, amounting to $932.28 would 
be paid; thereafter, the full salary of $416.66 for 
each month was to be paid each month." 
At no time was any amendment offered, or made to the 
complaint, to raise the issue of quantum meruit. 
Rule 15 (b) U. R. C. P. provides inter alia-
'' ... When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment 
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause 
them to confonn to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to 
amend does not effect the result of the trial of 
these issues . . . '' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
]I? 
7 
This Rule i~ not in point in the present case since 
an examination of the evidence both in the Transcript 
and as set out in the Brief reveals that no issue not 
raised by the pleadings were tried by either express or 
implied consent of the parties, or at all. 
The respondent ·s testimony at the trial showed his 
sole reliance on the issue of an express contract. Typical 
of respondent's sole reliance on an express contract, the 
following: (Tr. P38, 39, 40). 
If::. "BY "J[R. HARDING: Direct Examination 
~­
-. 
Q. Calling your attention to February of 1951, 
do you recall having a conversation with Mr. 
E. "JL Royle regarding the terms of a pro-
posed contract between you and the corpora-
tion for the coming year~ 
A. I don't recollect it in February. 
Q. 'Yhen did you first recall having a conversa-
tion with Mr. Royle regarding the terms of 
a contract? 
A. After I received a letter from him saying he 
couldn't pay what was being paid the previ-
ous year. 
Q. And when was that letter dated 1 
A. I'm not clear in my mind. That's been quite 
a while. (Discussion off the record.) 
Q. I show you what has been marked for identifi-
cation as plaintiff's Exhibit "F," and ask 
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you whether or not you have seen that be-
fore? (Handing) 
A. Yes sir. 
(~. Now does that refresh your recollection as to 
when you first learned from :Mr. Royle that 
tlwre was to be a change jn your basis of 
employment? 
A. That's the first that was mentioned, in this 
letter, and ~I r. Royle came down, and I told 
him that-
Q. \rha t is the date of this letter? 
A. r_rhat 's ~fay 11th, 1951. 
Q. Now after ~fay 11, 1951, did you have a con-
versation with ~Ir. Royle respecting the terms 
of your employment? 
A. Yes . .Jir. Royle was down to, was down a day 
or two after that, and I told him at that time 
I couldn't accept that. What he had to offer. 
And we agreed on-
Q. Now don't tell what you agreed. What did he 
say and "·hat did you say? 
A. At the time he said: 'Would you accept 
$5,000.00 a year salary and 8% on $60,000.00~' 
He said: 'Look like we're going to have a 
good business this coming year,' and I went 
over it quickly in my mind to see what it 
would be, and we'd have to have a lot more 
volume than we had the previous year to come 
out, and I said I would accept it. 
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Q. X ow was there any discussion concerning ho·w 
the $5,000.00 was to be paid"? 
~\. Yes, ~lr. Royle, I think he stated a.t that ti1ne 
he was under obligations, said, '\V e 'll pay 
you $300.00 drRwing account until'-! think 
in ~ ovember. if I remember right. At that 
ti1ne he would pay up the full amount of it. 
I think it run around 416 and some odd dol-
lars a month. At that time he would pay up 
all the $416.00 accumulated each month, then 
keep it current from then on. 
Q. \Vas any discussion had regarding any other 
matters~ 
A. Not at that time, if I remember. 
Q. At any time was any other discussion had 
regarding any other matters concerning your 
employment from March 1, 1951, to February 
29, 1952? 
A. X ot to my knowledge. 
Q. You had only this one discussion 1 
A. Only one discussion. 
Q. \Vith :Mr. Royle~ 
A. That's right." 
(Tr. P4~, 47, 48) 
"Q. In your conversation with :Mr. Royle the 
latter part of :May, 1951, with respect to a 
new contract of employment, was anything 
said by either you or Mr. Royle at that time 
about putting your agreement in writing~ 
A. No sir. 
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Q. What was vour understanding with reference 
to whethe; or not you had made a contract 
with the defendant corporation for the year 
March 1, 1951, to February 29, 1952, as a 
result of your conversation with :.M:r. Royle in 
Mayt 
MR. SMART: I object to that as calling for 
a conclusion of the witness. (Argument) 
THE COURT: He may answer. 
A. At that time the agreement was reached for 
a $5,000.00 salary, with a $300.00 drawing ac-
count until November. 
THE COURT: Q. Well, now, he asked you-
( To lir. Harding) What was your question, 
Judge? 
Q. What was your understanding with reference 
to whether or not you had made a contract¥ 
A. We made a contract. 
Q. That was your understanding at that time 1 
A. That was my understanding, that a contract 
was made at that time. 
Q. And that that contract pertained to the year 
1951-19521 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Related back at that time March 1, 1951: 
MR. SMART: I object to that as leading and 
suggestive. Leading the witness. 
THE COURT: I think it's leading. Be 
sustained. 
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Q. ""\Yht>n did the contract relate back to! 
A. ~larch the 1st. 
Q. ""\Yhat yearf 
A. 1951. 
Q. Now when did you first learn that there was 
any change in the agreement that you had 
n1ade with :Mr. Royle 1 
A. Along· in June some time. I couldn't give you 
the exact date. When his son brought down 
the written agreement there, that I refused. 
Q. Did that written agreement that was brought 
down to you express the agreement that you 
had entered into with Mr. Royle 1 
A. Part. 
Q. vVhat part did it express~ 
A. There was nothing at that time said about an-
tennas, there was nothing about a two-week 
vacation with pay, which had been policy, and 
about paying for extra help. 
Q. Now in what particulars did it express your 
agreement~ 
.A. That it would be $5,000.00 a year, with a 
$300.00 drawing account to N-ovember, I think 
it run around $116.00 a month holdback until 
that time, and after that date in November, 
after that was all paid up, then he was going 
to keep the $416.00 current until the 1st of 
March.'' 
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A reading of respondent'~ testimony reveals no 
:->tatement that doesn't relate solely to the question of 
nn express contract. 
To rai~e the issue of quantu1n meruit the pleader 
~hould ''aver performance of the work at defendant's 
reque:->t, the time of performance, the character and na-
tun· of tht· 8~rvices, the facts from which a promise to 
pay may be implied and the reasonable value of the serv-
ieP~." GS Am. J ur. :->:>7. under \York and Labor, Section 
;) 7. 
\Vhile a eount on an express contract to pay for 
~en·iees may be joined with a count on an implied con-
tract to pay therefor, no recovery 1nay be had for the 
value of services on the basis of an implied contract 
under a compla:int which declares on an express contract 
for sen-ices, where there is no pleading or proof of the 
reasonable value of the plaintiff's services. 58 Am. Jur. 
557, supra. 
·'It is a well-established general principle 
that one is required to try his case upon the issues 
which he makes in his pleadings and is ordinarily 
confined to the case as presented by the facts 
pleaded upon which issue is joined, and accord-
ingly a party cannot recover on an implied con-
tract where he pleads and relies upon an express 
contract." 58 Am. Jur. 536, Under Work and 
Labor, Section 33. 
Directly in point is Bloom vs. Nathan Vehon Co., 341 
Ill. 200, 173 NE 270, 72 ALR 232 (1930). 
In that case, plaintiff sued a corporation for salary, 
and by the pleadings set up an express oral contact. The 
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lower court gave judgment for plaintiff, and on appeal, 
the court reversed the judginent, finding the express 
contract void as beyond the power of the president of 
the corporation to make such a contract. In reply to 
plaintiff's argunwnt that he should recover on quantum 
meruit the Court said, page 238 of 72 ALR: 
''He could not do so under the pleadings in 
this case for two reasons: First, this suit is not 
based on quantum meruit, and second, there is 
no proof in the record as to what the services were 
reasonably worth.'' 
Also see Foster vs. Dwyer, 51 No. Dak. 581, 199 NW 
1017, 51 ALR 21; 'vherein the court held that upon plead-
ings of an account stated, plaintiff could not recover 
upon quantum meruit. 
Appellant is 1nindful of Rule 54 (C) (1)-U. R. C. P. 
which reads : 
"Generally, except as to a party against whom 
a judgment is entered by default, every final 
judgment shall gran.t the relief to which the party 
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if 
the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings . . . '' 
It is our position the Rule does not permit a judg-
ment contrary to the facts pleaded. A judgment must 
conform to facts pleaded and issues joined. Every 
judgment should be based upon facts pleaded. 
·iS In construing the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 
tt> from which is ours is taken, the Court in Kansas City, St. 
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f~ouis and C. R. Company vs Alton R. Co., (7 Cir.) 124 
Ft-<l. 2d 780 (cited in Morris vs. Russell in ---------- Utah 
-........ , 236, Pac. 2d 451, 455) ~aid at page 783: 
"If appellant has stated a cause of action for 
any relief, it is immaterial what he designates it 
or what he has asked for in his prayer, the Court 
will grant him the relief to which he is entitled 
under the facts pleaded." (Italics mine) 
ln Susi Contracting Company 1/·s. Zera Contracting 
Company, (2 Cir.) 146 Fed. 2d 606 (also cited in Morris 
vs. Russell, supra), which was an action resulting out of 
breach of contract, the Court said, had the pleader relied 
on the COJttruct, he lruuld halie been lim,ited to its terms, 
but where plaintiff had made a general allegation for the 
vahw of work performed, and had waived the breach of 
contract, the defendant, who breached the contract, could 
not limit him to the contract tern1s. The Court said in 
construction contracts plaintiff may waive the breach of 
con tract and sue for the value of work on a quantum 
meruit count. 
In Morris vs. Russell, __________ Utah __________ , 236 Pac. 2d 
451, plaintiff pleaded express contract in one count and 
quantum meruit for the reasonable Yalue of his services 
in another count. At conclusion of plaintiff's case, the 
Court on motion struck out the quantum meruit count. · 
At the conclusion of defendant's evidence and after both 
' parties considered quantum meruit still in issue, the 
Court reinstated the count on quantu1n 1neruit. This 
Court held that such was permissible under the Rules. 
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An analy~is of the ~LotTi~ ease rPYI.:'als the following: 
1. The pleading contained a quanhun mPruit count. 
,) Trial wa~ had on the quantun1 n1eruit count. 
3. By Inotion the quantum 1neruit count was r<>in-
stated in the pleading~ after having· been struck 
out on nwtion. 
-!. Both parties knew this would be an issue at the 
trial. 
X ot one of the above four distinguishing points are 
present in the case at bar. 
Rule 8, (C) (:2)-U. C.P.R. permit:s a party to state 
as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless 
of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable 
grounds or on both. This liberality in procedural matters 
permits a party to set forth all the causes of action he 
cares to make. If plaintiff choose~ to set forth one and 
stand on it. and never thereafter amends or offers to 
amend his pleadings so a~ to include a new or different 
cause of action and trial is had on that cause of action 
only, he is bound by his choice. Within the facts pleaded, 
the Court may grant the relief to which a party is en-
titled under Rule 54-(c)-(1), as supported by evidence. 
In granting judgment a Court, under thiS- Rule, is not 
permitted to go beyond the scope of the pleadings; that 
is beyond the facts ·which are pleaded and upon which 
issue is joined and tried. 
The Rule is stated in Syllabus l in Atwater vs. No. 
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,Jmcrican ( 'oal Corp., Dis. Ct., S. D., N. Y. 1940, 36 Fed. 
~up. H7r>: 
'' lJ nder the federal ruling providing that 
every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled even if the party has not demanded such 
rdief in hi:-; pleadings, the relief to which a plain-
tiff i:-; entitl<·d depends upon the facts pleaded and 
not upon theories. Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
ePdurt>, Rule 54 (c), 28 USCA following Section 
723 (c)." 
Cases construing the Federal Rule 54 (c) are an-
notated and discu:-;sed in Fed. Rules Digest, Vol. 2, pages 
2;)7 to 2(iU, under Judgments, Rule 54, (c) 2, and in 
Federal Rules Service, Volume 8, pages 822 to 834, cases 
1 to 7 inclusive. 
The Federal cases construing the Rule seem to fall 
into two categories: (l}That under a prayer for general 
relief, the Court may grant relief to which a party is 
entitled providing issue is properly raised. Michael Del 
Palso, Inc. vs. Carozza, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 56, 136 Fed. 
2d 280, and (2) That the Court may grant him the relief 
to which he is entitled regardless of his prayer if he 
is entitled to relief under the facts pleaded. Kansas City, 
St. Louis and C. R. Co. vs. Alton R. Co., supra. 
In the case at bar the respondent pleaded and ad-
duced evidence on the issue of an express contract only. 
Issue was joined thereon. No amendments to the plead-
ings ·were offered and no evidence introduced to support 
i1nplied contract. The respondent in his sworn testimony 
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relied upon an express contraet and upon an express con-
tract only. He neither pleaded or proved an implied con-
tract or quantmn 1neruit. On ~nch record the Court, under 
the Rules, was limited to making Findings and entering 
Judgment upon the issue of an express contract. The 
Court having found that the respondent failed to prove 
the allegations of his COinplaint, to-wit: an express con-
tract, should have entered jndgn1ent for the appellant. 
Respondent having failed to prove the allegations of his 
Complaint, it was error for the Court to enter judgment 
for the re~pondent, and further error to deny appellant's 
"Jiotion to ~\Iter and Vacate the Findings of Fact, Con-
rlusions of Law, and Judgment and enter new Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in favor of 
the appellant. 
POINT NO.2 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT IN THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
- DENCE WAS INTRODUCED FROM WHICH THE COURT 
COULD FIND FOR THE RESPONDENT ON IMPLIED CON-
TRACT, i.e. QUANTUM MERUIT. 
A . 
..:\s pointed out in Argument No. 1, respondent sued 
upon an express contract only. A reading of the Tran-
script reveals the entire testimony related to expres~ 
contract. 
Only two matters were in issue, as revealed by the 
pleadings and the testimony. First, the unpaid balance 
due respondent for the contract year l\Iarch 1st, 1950 
to February 28, 1951. Second, did appellant and re-
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spondent make a new contract or change the terms of 
compensation of the old contract. These were the only 
two i:-:Hw:-;. Respondent's testimony, both on direct and 
(·ro:-;:o;-<•xamination claimed only the formation of a new 
c•tmtract, in l\lay, 1951, allegedly changing the salary 
und h11ull;.; t<•rml' of the existing contract. On this issue, 
tlw Court found against the respondent. 
Among the elements of proof under quantum meruit, 
Pven when it is raised by pleadings, is evidence of the 
reasonable ,~alue of the services. 58 Am. Jur. 560, Sec-
tion 62. There is no substantial evidence in the record 
of the value of respondent's services during the period 
2\larch 1:-;t through July 13, 1951, except that which was 
pai.d aud acce pfed. 
The only other evidence which could by any stretch 
of imagination relate to this question was the qualified 
~tatements of the appellant. 
On page 19 of the Transcript, in discussing what 
respondent had earned during the contract year March 
1st, 1950 to February :28, 1951, and which included bonus 
faT a full year's service, respondent's attorney asked: 
'' Q. You didn't consider that unreasonable, did 
you? 
A. No, not for that period." 
On pag-e 26 of the ~rranscript regarding the pro-
posed new contract calling for a per annum salary of 
$5,000.00, counsel asked:-
'' Q. Now you didn't think that was unreasonable, 
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did you to pay hi1n a salary, guaranteed 
~alary of $5,000.00 for the year? 
A. X o, under the conditions, of course not.'' 
~\ppellant wa~ asked by his counsel what he meant by the 
last above an::;wer and use of the per annum salary in 
the proposed contract. (Tr. P30, 31, 3~) 
'' Q. X ow, :Jlr. Royle, Judge Harding read to you 
the following statement from Exhibit "H": 
'B. D. Tailor shall be paid a monthly draw-
ing account of $300.00 against an annual in-
conle guarantee of $5,000.00 for the period of 
.Jlarch 1st, 1951 to February 29th, 1952.' In 
response to his question of whether the figure 
of $5,000.00 was used you said 'yes.' What 
did you mean by that 1 
A. That's,provided he stayed the year. 
Q. That's provided he stayed the full year from 
March 1, 1951 until February 29, 1952? 
A. Surely. 
Q. You used the figure of a drawing account of 
$300.00. Now that was used for what pur-
pose1 
A. That was to offset the man's current ex-
penses. That's what he drew, the $5,000.00 for 
the yeB:_r, and, well, that's just a habit among 
firms. As a g·eneral thing they have a draw-
ing account up to so much, and then they 
don't get paid their full pay until they have 
served out the tenure of their employment. 
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Q. Now the last paragraph of plaintiff's Exhibit 
'' H,'' which waH not read to you, but which 
1 will read to you, states: 'Agressive selling 
is the essence of this agreement and E. M. 
Ruyle Corporation is relieved of responsi-
bility for 11wne!} guarantees as stipulated in 
I kis contract unless a determined capable 
('ffort is 11Wde to obtain a minimum volume of 
$(}o,ooo.oo and under favorable ])lminess con-
ditions to exceed it as far as practicable in 
keeping with good business judgment'. W'as 
that paragraph put in as a part of the con-
tract that he should stay the full year and 
attempt to reach a volurne of $60,000.00 for 
the year t (Italics mine) 
A. 1 es. Because l was under the pressure of 
'raylor's Departrnent Store to increase the 
volume. They were dissatisfied with the 
volume. They wanted outside salesmen em-
ployed, and a very aggressive campaign put 
on. 
Q. In the operation of that type of a business, 
are your sales possibilities and your sales 
volume heaYier during the fall months of 
October, November and December than they 
are the spring months of March, April and 
.May? 
A. Considerably higher, yes, in the fall. During 
October, X oven1ber and December. 
Q. And because of that, is that the reason you 
needed to have the full year's employment~ 
A. Correct. That's the reason that was held 
back until November 1st, when that should 
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be paid to hold an employee there 1n that 
period of time. 
Q. So that you won't have to be breaking in a 
new man right when your business is busiest •t 
A. That's correct. A safety provision.'' 
The Cmwt will observe that the above questions 
and ans,:rer:::., i.e. the previous year's salary and bonus 
and the $:1,000.00 per annum, were exploration of the 
terms of the alleged express contract. The Court will 
further obseiTe the appellant's answers related to the 
term~ of a proposed contraet, and conditions to be met by 
re2pondent. ·~he first based on a full year's services and 
an earned bonus for vohnne produced duing that year. 
The second hased upon a full year's service with a ''de-
tenniPcd capable effort" to obtain a stated volume of 
~ales. 
The logical inference frmn the ans·wers is that the 
:-;um of $5,000.00, under the proposed contract was to 
be paid only ~f the conditions '''ere met. These conditions 
were conditions precedent to the obligation to pay. See 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Vol. I, Sec. 269, 
270, pages 391 to 393, inclusive. Business-wi~e, this is 
particularly cogent when it affirmatively appears the fall 
months are the important n1onths in a business of this 
type. An employee's services are worth more in the 
busy months, the fall and early winter, than in the spring 
and summer. Tenure of employment i~ important to the 
employer as well as to the employee. The employer needs 
to know the employee will be at work during that period 
of the year when he is needed most. No evidence was ad-
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1ltwPd ol' l'Pa:-;onahle value of services based upon a four-
month tenure of employment during the slack season, 
t'Yc·c·pt that which was paid by appellant and accepted 
wi/Jwut protest, objection, or qualification by respondent. 
'l'lw above i:-; all the evidence to support the Court's 
l•,indiug-:-; of Fad ~ o. 6. \V e submit this evidence is in-
~ul'l'i<·i<·rtt to support a finding on quantum meruit, par-
t i<·ula rly when tit(' i:-;:-:ue of implied cm~tract was not 
l'aised. I~,urthermore, the only ('ompetent evidence of the 
n~a:--onahlP value or tlw ~~·tTi('<'s is that which was paid 
hy the appellant <·\·Pr~· t\\·(J weeks from March 1, 1951 
on, and a1·<·(·pted 1'\'(_•ry two weeks lJy respondent as 
payment for hi:-: :--PI'Yi('e:-:. 
B. 
In an action on implied contract (quantum meruit) 
there n1ust be an intent on the part of the master to pay 
for the :-:PrYi('P and an intent on the part of the servant to 
work for pay. 
· ·. . . an ·express contract' is one expressed in 
words, 'vhile an 'in1plied contract' is one where 
1nutual intent is n1anifested by particular acts 
and attendant circumstances. 28 RCL 667 ... " 
Gleason vs. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 74 P 2d 
1~:23, 1227. 
If one, at the tinw of rendering services for another, 
does not intend to make any charge therefor, he cannot 
later maintain an action to recover for the same, for the 
law cannot imply a promise contrary to the intention of 
the parties. 
''The rule is that when a party voluntarily 
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does an act or render~ service, and there. was no 
intention at the tin1e that he should charg·e there-
for, or understanding that the other should pay, 
he "'ill not be permitted to recover for that which 
was originally intended as a gratuity cannot be 
subsequently turned into a charge ... '' 54 ALR 
548, 550, quoting from Kerr vs. Cusenhary, 60 
~Io . .App. 558. 
This is the holding of the cases as annotated in 
54 .ALR 548. 
The rule a~ stated in 58 An1. Jur., Section 7, Page 
515 is: 
''A promise to pay for services rendered 
without an express contract as to compensation 
will not be implied in fact where there are no 
circumstances or conduct warranting the infer-
ence of such a promise or where the circunl-
stances or conduct warrant a contrary inference. 
Such a promise is not implied where the person 
benefitted has said or done nothing from which 
such a promise may be inferred, or where, at the 
time they were rendered, it was intended, under-
stood, or agreed that no pay·ment should be Inade 
for them." 
In the case at bar, the respondent, by his testirnony, 
testified that nothing was said about changing the con-
tract until ~.[ay 15, 1951. He performed his services with 
the intent of receiving pay at the sa1ne rate as existed 
during the previous contract year. By his own testimony 
he is precluded from recovery on an intphied contract, 
since he, by his sworn testimony, did not perform the 
services with the intent of charging m.ore:, or being paid 
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'JJIUI't', ur uu an.tJ other basis, than that which e:risted by 
nJIIf rot'/ Jn·ior to March 1st, 1951. 
~\ud the other horn of the dilemna upon which 
n•:·q>Ondent finds hinu;elf il-' that the appellant testified 
that whilP a nt>\\' <'ontraet was being discussed, he con-
;-;idPred th<> pr<·,·iou~ <·ontract extended and in effect. He 
pai<l, and rP~p<mdent accepted without protest, objection 
or qualifi<'atiuu, both salary and bonus, according to the 
terms of tlH· contract under which the parties had worked 
:uni<·<wly tlw pn·,·ious year. 
Rt>eo\·ery may be restricted to an amount to be 
detennined by the employer, good faith being assumed. 
Obiter in ny ooldridge vs. Wareing,---------- Utah----------, 236 
Pac. 2d 341, 342. 
\rhen work i~ performed m1der an express contract 
and at the expiration of the contract, the same service 
continues and the employer pays and the employee 
accepts without prote~t compensation on the previous 
terms, the contract is extended according to the terms of 
the previous contract. (See Argument No. 3). 
If, at the end of the contract year, the same service is 
continued, and pay is made and accepted at the same 
rate, and the employee testifies that nothing was said 
about changing the contract until more than two months 
into the new contract year and the employer testified 
that he considered the contract extended during the time 
negotiations were going on, there is no ground for quan-
tum meruit suit, sinee no intention on the part of the 
employer to pay more, nor an intention on the part of 
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the employee to demand more, can, under the circuin-
stances be iinplied. 
w· e submit the rule is that where negotiations for 
change in the contract are carried on at the conclusion 
of a contract year, during the course of which negotia-
tions, the san1e e1nployment services is required, and pay 
for such service is made at the same rate, there is no 
basis for a holding on an in1plied contract. 
If the employee is to rely on implied contract, he 
should e~~pre~sly and unmistakenly notify the employer 
that he ·will not continue to work under the old terms. 
If, after such notice, the en1ployer continues to accept 
<:·mployee's services then the employer would be liable 
upon i1nplied contract. This would follow because notice 
has been given that the employee will rely on something 
other than what has been followed in the past. Absent 
~uch notice, however, it should be presumed in law, that 
the parties continued on the old basis, subject to an 
agreement upon a new contract. Henkel vs. J. J. I-Ienkel 
Co., 212 Cal. 288, 298 Pac. 28. 
In the case at bar, not only "\Va~.; there no protest of 
continuation of service on the contract terms, but more 
cogent still, the respondent testified he knew of no 
negotiations or suggested changes in the contract until 
the n1iddle of _May, 21/2 months into the new contract 
year. On what basis could the Court then find an implied 
demand on the part of the employee to receive more than 
what was paid according to the terms under which the 
parties had been working~ On_ what basis could the 
Court find an implied promise on the part of the em-
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ploypr· to pay more than what he had been required to 
pay unupr· the t(•rm:-; of the previous contracU 
'' ... J I O\\'t•ver, no eontract implied in fact to make 
eompensation for personal services performed for 
another arises unless the party furnishing the 
~Prvi(·e:-; then (':J:pected or had reason to expect the 
payment of compensation by the other party. To 
gh·(· riH<> to an implied contract to pay for serv-
it·P~, they mu~t have been rendered by one party 
in the (~ x pPetation that the other party would pay 
for them, and ha n:• been accepted by the other 
party with knowledge of that expectation ... "58 
£\m .. Jur .. P :J12, See. 3. (Italics mine) 
Gjuric/1 rs. Fieg, 164 Cal. 429, 129 Pac. 464. 
J!uuliu rs. Uulu111bet, 22 Cal. 508, ______ Pac. ··----· 
JVcscoatf z·s. ~feeker, 63 C. A. 2d 618, 147 P 2d 
41. 
POINT NO.3 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, IN THAT THE 
EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT 
WAS EMPLOYED UNDER AN EXPRESS CONTRACT AND 
COULD NOT THEREFORE RECOVER ON THE BASIS OF 
AN IMPLIED CONTRACT . 
..:\:-; stated in Argu1nent X o. 1, respondent in this 
action relied wholly upon an alleged new agreement, 
changing the terms of his compensation fr01n that paid 
during the preceding contract year. The Court found 
there had been no new agreement between the parties. 
In his testimony, respondent expressly stated no 
discussion was had about changes in his contract until 
about May 15, 1951. (Tr. P39). This- was 2112 months 
after a ne"· employment year. On page 40 of the Tran-
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script, respondent testified this was the only discussion 
regarding the contract. 
"Q. At any time was any other discussion had 
regarding any other matters concerning your 
employment from March 1st, 1951 to Febru-
ary 29th, 19521 
A. ~ ot to my knowledge. 
Q. Yon had only this one di~~__·ussion J 
..:\.. Only this one discussion. 
Q. \Vith Mr. Royle~ 
A. That's right." 
The la '" go,rerning extension of contracts by continuation 
of services is stated in 35 Am. Jur., Page 460, Section 23 
of -:\faster and Servant,as follows: 
"S 23 Extension of Contract by Continua-
tion of Services after Contract Period. Where 
one, who has been employed by another for a 
definite and fixed period continues in the service 
of the employer after the expiration of the period 
limited by the original employment, it is presumed 
in the absence of anything to show a contrary in-
tention that the continued services are to be 
rendered for the same period as that fi."'\:ed by 
the original agreement. This is true, at any rate, 
where the parties intended the original term of 
employment to be no longer than one year. While 
the presumption in question may be overcmne by 
evidence showing that the continuation of· the em-
ployment was pursuant to a new agreement, a 
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e!lange. of the amount of the employee's compensa-
tion w1ll not have this effect.'' 
St~l' lln1kel v. J . . 1. Henkel Co., 212 Cal. 288, 298, 
Pa<·. 28; Holt v. Hart Mill Co., 24 "\Vash. 2d 
493, l ()(i Pac. 2d 186; Stewart Dry Goods Co. 
lj, Hutchison, 177 Ky. 757, 198 S.W. 17, LRA 
1 ~}} K C 704 Annotation LRA 1918 C 708. 
rrhe appellant testified the express contract con-
tintwd up to the time respondent quit. 
··Q. (By tlw Court) X ow was there any length of 
time to this agreement? 
A. No, that functioned until July 13, 1951.'' 
(Tr. P5) . 
.. Appellant further testified that he discussed a 
''realignment'' of the contract with the respondent, dur-
ing the spring of 1951. That during this time the previ-
on~ eontrart terms continued and that the parties 
operated under it. (Tr. P15, 16, 18, 30, 32). 
In addition to the rule of continuing a contract by 
continuation of servil'es, the appellant in response to 
questions hy the Court and counsel specifically stated the 
terms of the contract under which the respondent had 
been working were continued during these negotiations, 
and appellant paid the salary and bonus during this 
period of time. The salary and bonus for sales of tele-
vision sets were accepted, without protest, question or 
qualification, by the respondent. The respondent did not 
deny that he worked from March 1 to May 15, 1951, on 
the previous contract terms. Indeed, since he testified a 
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chang-e of terms was never discussed prior to about 
.May 15, 1951, he could not have denied that he worked 
~larch, .April and the first half of 1\Iay, 1951, except 
on the same terms which were in effect during the pre-
vious contract. James vs. Pa.ramm11nt Famous Lasky 
Corp., 38 Cal. App. 585, 33 P 2d 63. 
\Ye submit, the Court, having found the parties did 
not make a new contract as contended by respondent, 
erred in not finding plaintiff employed on the terms he 
was employed under during the previous contract year. 
Hen.kel vs. J. J Henkel Co., supra. 
Had respondent continued to work for the remainder 
of the contract year, he could have demanded and re-
cPived the bonus based on volume of sales for the year 
under the rule of extension of contract. (Cases supra). 
Since an express contract and an implied contract 
-- on the same subject and between the same parties cannot 
eixst at the same time, the Court erred in finding an 
implied contract on these facts. 
Verdi vs. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 196 P 225, 
15 ALR 641, 647. 
" ... The complaint was predicated upon an ex-
press contract to pay interest, and not upon an 
implied one. It is axiomatice that where an ex-
press contract exists one may not be implied. 2 
Elliott Contr. Sec. 1360; 9 Cyc 242. Ordinarily, 
therefore, where the plaintiff seeks to recover 
upon an express contract, he cannot rely upon an 
implied one . . . '' 
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12 Ant. Jur. P. 505, Sec. 7. 
Art Wire Stamping Co., vs. Johnson, et al, 141 N.J. 
E. 101, 56 At. 2d 11. 
CONCLUSION 
In Argument No. 1, appellant has shown the plead-
ings joined issue on an express contract only, and the 
issue of implied contract was never raised. In Argument 
No. 2, appellant has shown the evidence adduced at the 
trial related to the issue of an express contract only and 
there is no evidence to support a finding or judgment 
upon an implied contract. In Argument No. 3, appellant -
has shown the evidence conclusively establishes the con- ~ 
tinuation of an express contract. ~-
I respectfully subinit the District Court's ruling 
should be reversed and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgrn.ent should be entered in favor of the 
appellant. 
HERBERT F. SMART 
Attorney for Appellant 
1122 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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